Artans - astronomy chalengers

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1YAaaDIqkc5VKrPFF7kkOTO4Lonx3-zME?usp=sharing

https://youtu.be/N_od75g70JM,https://youtu.be/zx6uMCoW2gQ

It has four sections:

• User Status (tells the risk of getting COVID-19 for the user)
• Self Assess (helps the users identify COVID-19 symptoms and their risk profile)
• COVID-19 Updates (gives updates on local and national COVID-19 cases)
• E-pass integration (if applied for E-pass, it will be available)
• See Recent Contacts option (allows the users to assess the risk level of their Bluetooth contacts)

It tells how many COVID-19 positive cases are likely in a radius of 500 m, 1 km, 2 km, 5 km and 10 km from the user. The app is built on a platform that can provide an application programming interface (API) so that other computer programs, mobile applications, and web services can make use of the features and data available in AryaKavach.

This allowed users to schedule an appointment through the app for COVID-19 vaccine by registering their phone number and providing relevant documents.

We have used data from various space agencies, prioritizing NASA. Also data and statistics provided by organizations such as the WHO, local and international health organizations, among others.The app got stars only for the policy which suggests that data collected is deleted after a period of time and that the data collection, as far as user inputs go, is minimal. It also highlighted that India is the only democracy making its app mandatory for millions of people. The rating was further downgraded from 2 to 1 for collecting more information than the app needs to function.

Following this, it made the source code of the Android app public on GitHub on 26 May, which will be followed by iOS and API documentation. Further, the Government has also launched a "bug bounty program".This was done to "promote transparency and ensure security and integrity of the app". However, experts stated that the server-side code had not yet been publicly released, which meant that public opinion on security and privacy was yet to be completely assuaged.Following this, ZDNet noted that the source code seemed to confirm the government's claim that user location data, if collected, would be anonymised and would be deleted after 45 days, or 60 days for high-risk individuals.Numerous applications have been developed or proposed, with official government support in some territories and jurisdictions. Several frameworks for building contact tracing apps have been developed. Privacy concerns have been raised, especially about systems that are based on tracking the geographical location of app users.

Ethical principles of mass surveillance using COVID-19 contact tracing appsEdit

The advent of COVID-19 contact tracing apps has led to concerns around privacy, the rights of app users, and governmental authority. The European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations and the Siracusa Principles have outlined 4 principles to consider when looking at the ethical principles of mass surveillance with COVID-19 contact tracing apps. These are necessity, proportionality, scientific validity, and time boundedness.

Necessity is defined as the idea that governments should only interfere with a person's rights when deemed essential for public health interests.The potential risks associated with infringements of personal privacy must be outweighed by the possibility of reducing significant harm to others.Potential benefits of contact-tracing apps that may be considered include allowing for blanket population-level quarantinemeasures to be lifted sooner and the minimization of people under quarantine.[18]Hence, some contend that contact-tracing apps are justified as they may be less intrusive than blanket quarantine measures.[19] Furthermore, the delay of an effective contact-tracing app with significant health and economic benefits may be considered unethical.[citation needed]

Proportionality refers to the concept that a contact tracing app's potential negative impact on a person's rights should be justifiable by the severity of the health risks that are being addressed.Apps must use the most privacy-preserving options available to achieve their goals, and the selected option should not only be a logical option for achieving the goal but also an effective one.

Scientific validity evaluates whether an app is effective, timely and accurate.Traditional manual contact-tracing procedures are not efficient enough for the COVID-19 pandemic and do not consider asymptomatictransmission. Contact-tracing apps, on the other hand, can be effective COVID-19 contact-tracing tools that could lead to a R value less than 1 and sustained epidemic suppression.However, for apps to be effective, there needs to be a minimum 56-60% uptake in the population.Apps should be continually modified to reflect current knowledge on the diseases being monitored.Some argue that contact-tracing apps should be considered societal experimental trials where results and adverse effects are evaluated according to the stringent guidelines of social experiments.Analyses should be conducted by independent research bodies and published for wide dissemination. Despite the current urgency of our pandemic situation, we should still adhere to the standard rigors of scientific evaluation.

Time boundedness describe the need for establishing legal and technical sunset clauses so that they are only allowed to operate as long as necessary to address the pandemic situation. Apps should be withdrawn as soon as possible after the end of the pandemic. If the end of the pandemic cannot be predicted, the use of apps should be regularly reviewed and decisions about continued use should be made at each review. Collected data should only be retained by public health authorities for research purposes with clear stipulations on how long the data will be held for and who will be responsible for security, oversight, and ownership.

1.  Excludes users who use both the physical token and the app, or the physical token exclusively.
2. ^ Ferretti, Luca; Wymant, Chris; Kendall, Michelle; Zhao, Lele; Nurtay, Anel; Abeler-Dörner, Lucie; Parker, Michael; Bonsall, David; Fraser, Christophe (2020-03-31). "Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing". Science. 368 (6491): eabb6936. doi:10.1126/science.abb6936. ISSN 0036-8075. PMC 7164555. PMID 32234805.
3. ^ "Contact tracing may help avoid another lockdown. Can it work in the U.S.?". 2020-05-29.
4. ^ "Contact tracing is a race. But few U.S. states say how fast they're running". The Washington Post.
5. ^ Kelion, Leo (2020-04-16). "NHS coronavirus app to target 80% of smartphones". BBC News. Retrieved 2020-04-16.
6. ^ Ferretti, Luca; Wymant, Chris; Kendall, Michelle; Zhao, Lele; Nurtay, Anel; Abeler-Dörner, Lucie; Parker, Michael; Bonsall, David; Fraser, Christophe (2020-03-31). "Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing". Science. 368 (6491): eabb6936. doi:10.1126/science.abb6936. PMC 7164555. PMID 32234805.
7. ^ Servick, Kelly (2020-03-22). "Cellphone tracking could help stem the spread of coronavirus. Is privacy the price?". Science. doi:10.1126/science.abb8296. S2CID 216518303. Retrieved 2020-04-26.
8. ^ "Contact Tracing in the Real World | Light Blue Touchpaper". Retrieved 2020-04-15.
9. ^ "Tracetogether". Singapore Government. 2020-07-02. Retrieved 2020-07-02.
10. ^ Stokel-Walker, Chris (2020-04-15). "Can mobile contact-tracing apps help lift lockdown?". www.bbc.com. Retrieved 2020-04-18.
11. ^ a b Kelion, Leo (2020-04-16). "Coronavirus: NHS contact tracing app to target 80% of smartphone users". BBC News. Retrieved 2020-05-01.
12. ^ Tracking Apps are Unlikely to Help Stop COVID-19 ACLU, 6 August 2020
13. ^ Sherr, Ian. "Apple, Google, Amazon block nonofficial coronavirus apps from app stores". CNET. Retrieved 2020-04-16.
14. ^ Lyons, Kim (2020-03-14). "Apple puts restrictions on coronavirus-themed apps in its App Store". The Verge. Retrieved 2020-04-16.
15. ^ a b Morley J, Cowls J, Taddeo M, Floridi L. Ethical guidelines for COVID-19 tracing apps. 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01578-0.

#Software #AryanSingh #Artans #App #Aryakavach #Riskstoper #CoronAttention #COVID19

This project has been submitted for consideration during the Judging process.